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My dissertation explores the history of inter-American collaboration in hemisphere 
defense during World War II, focusing on the construction and operation of a network of U.S. 
military bases throughout Latin America.  By examining issues such as labor conflict, 
jurisdictional disputes, social relations, and infrastructure development on and around U.S. bases, 
I explore how the terms of inter-American cooperation in this aspect of the defense effort were 
negotiated at the local, national and international levels.  I am especially interested in how fields 
such as public health, development and goodwill were viewed as security concerns during this 
period and became incorporated into plans for hemisphere defense.  In the summer of 2012, I 
visited the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) in search of material that would inform the chapter 
of my dissertation that explores public health work on and around U.S. bases in the region, and 
to understand more broadly the growing belief in various sectors of the U.S. government that 
investment in social and economic problems in Latin America would enhance U.S. national 
security.  
On the eve of World War II, advances in aviation technology and weapons systems had 
increased the vulnerability of the United States by decreasing the distance between places.  It 
was in response to this new environment that military strategists thought of national security in 
terms of hemisphere defense and sought to build a network of U.S. bases throughout the 
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Americas.  In the same way that aviation and the shrinking of the globe made the U.S. population 
more open to enemy inroads in Latin America, it also made them more susceptible to disease.  
Dr. Alberto Recio, the Cuban Director of Health and Social Welfare, described a similar re-
imagining of the map in regards to disease prevention as it was occurring in defense strategy, 
“with increased air transportation, the countries of the world will be brought so close together 
that in fighting infecto-contagious diseases … the present concept of national boundaries will 
have to be changed as far as public health is concerned and be substituted by a “global” concept 
and if this is not feasible by at least continental boundaries.”1   
Public health and sanitation became linked with the defense effort in a number of ways.  
First, military strategists who sought to station U.S. soldiers in malaria-heavy regions of the 
hemisphere saw the minimal public health infrastructure in some parts of the Caribbean and 
Latin America as a literal threat to the defense effort; Second, tropical disease stood to hamper 
worker productivity in the extraction of strategic raw materials; and third, a lack of development 
in public health infrastructure was seen as a threat to the defense effort in a less concrete fashion, 
in that some figures within the government argued that the U.S. must invest in socio-economic 
problems in Latin America to counteract the appeal of fascism.  As Vincenzo Petrullo of the 
Office of Strategic Services explained in a memo to the State Department in June of 1941, 
Nazism has offered a ‘better’ political and economic way of life, a positive program of 
action, an incentive and a goal, in short—a hope.  It also offers freedom from Yankee 
domination … To a considerable degree however, its strength lies in the weakness of the 
‘opposition’ and in that no feasible alternative is being offered to the Latin American 
peoples … the Democracies have been depending on diplomatic accords, polite 
expressions of faith, and the hit or miss goodwill of commercial entrepreneurs … Very 
little has been tried in fields which effect the daily life of the ordinary citizen and no 
direct action has been taken to sell the democratic way of life to the people at large.
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Warnings such as this resounded especially loud with those concerned with the security of 
the hemisphere.  According to the invasion scenario that helped shape many U.S. plans for 
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hemisphere defense, the support of a “fifth column” of Axis sympathizers already living in Latin 
America would aid any military initiatives that Axis powers might initiate in the region.  This 
meant that the U.S. sought not only the cooperation of Latin American political leaders, but the 
allegiance of the Latin American people—an allegiance that could not be negotiated through a 
series of diplomatic exchanges, but could perhaps be won by investment in development.   
Ultimately, in the spring of 1942, the Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA) was 
created through the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) with a mandate 
to conduct health and sanitation work to address all three of these concerns.  However, the IIAA 
was not the first attempted solution to the “problem” of public health around current and 
projected overseas bases.  First, the Navy and War Departments experimented with public-
private collaboration with the Rockefeller Foundation’s (RF) International Health Division 
(IHD). 
Between the outbreak of war in Europe and the attack on Pearl Harbor, the foreign 
ministers of the American republics held two meetings to discuss plans for hemisphere defense.  
While a united front was agreed upon in broad strokes, much of the plans for active collaboration 
in defense, such as allowing U.S. soldiers to utilize airfields on foreign soil, were contingent on 
an attack on an American nation.  The U.S. armed forces already occupied territory in 
Guantanamo and the Panama Canal Zone, and while secret plans were drawn up to construct 
further airfields throughout the region, overt negotiations with the governments of Panama and 
Cuba were carried out to expand the reaches of their existent facilities.  Meanwhile, the U.S. 
attained the right to bases in the British Caribbean. Consequently, public health at these locations 
became an early concern of the Armed Forces.  The War and Navy Departments reached out to 
the IHD for assistance.  
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In a letter to IHD staff, Wilbur Sawyer, the Director of the IHD, explained the basic 
premise of the RF’s potential contribution to the war effort, “four of the diseases in which the 
Division has specialized—malaria, yellow fever, influenza and typhus—are of paramount 
importance in this war. Also, the Division's activities in Latin America and in the Far East are 
obviously essential.”3  In another letter, this one to Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Sawyer 
elaborated further, “the Surgeon General of the Army and his officers entrusted with preventative 
medicine … have pointed out that, as a civilian organization with an international field of 
activity, we are in a strategic position to work with foreign governments in studying and 
improving health conditions near the new bases in the Caribbean and elsewhere.”4  In other 
words, the RF already had an existing international network of resources and relationships, as 
well extensive knowledge and experience that might enable them to erect a public health strategy 
more quickly and effectively than would be possible for U.S. government or military officials.   
In addition to the utility of the IHD’s experience, the fact that the RF was a private 
organization staffed with civilian doctors was especially appealing. When Sawyer consulted with 
the Surgeon Generals of the Navy and Army regarding offers from some of the IHD’s medical 
staff to join the Armed Forces, they responded that they believed the IHD personnel “might 
perform a much more useful service to the government in a civilian rather than a military 
status.”5  In fact, in the months that followed the attack on Pearl Harbor and the U.S. declaration 
of war, the IHD was given reassurance that its staff would be granted deferment from military 
service.
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One reason for the preference for civilian doctors was that while a doctor sitting on an 
Army commission could not engage in similar work for the Navy, the IHD could support both 
forces.
7
  Another reason was that splintering the existing structure of the IHD by putting its 
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members into new, unfamiliar positions would weaken its advantage.
8
  Except, perhaps the most 
important reason that a civilian agency was preferred, particularly for work in Latin America, 
had to do with perception and reception abroad.  The presence of the U.S. military in Latin 
America was an extremely sensitive issue.  U.S. occupation of Guantanamo and the Canal Zone 
was long seen as a symbol of Yankee imperialism.  Furthermore, the War and Navy Departments 
were not only concerned with health and sanitation infrastructure on the bases, but they wanted 
work done around the bases, as disease did not respect such artificial boundaries.  This would 
require the encroachment of U.S. intervention into new territory.  It seemed that the RF, which 
already operated on a cooperative basis with many Latin American governments, would be 
viewed in a more amenable light as an agency independent of the government.   
In the case of attempted health work around the Guantanamo Bay Naval Reserve, this is 
did not prove to be entirely the case.  The RF had been cooperating with the Cuban Department 
of Health continuously since 1935, when it launched two projects: a Malaria Commission, 
charged with the task of conducting health surveys of the island, and a Malaria Control 
Demonstration Unit, that later expanded into a multi-service County Health Unit in Marianao. 
The Marianao Health Unit was meant to serve as a model to be replicated in other Cuban 
counties, ultimately overhauling the public health system.  In line with the RF’s traditional model, 
the RF and the Cuban government each contributed a determined amount of the money required 
to run these programs.  Each year, the RF’s share of the cost decreased while the government’s 
share increased, until a projected date when the program would become fully funded and 
operated by the Cuban government.
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The Navy Department approached the IHD in 1941 about establishing a health unit in 
Guantanamo County as cases of malaria began to appear among the increasing number of U.S. 
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soldiers stationed at the naval base.  The U.S. ambassador to Cuba told the IHD he believed that 
“the activities of the U.S. government in the area should be as restricted as possible and that the 
malaria control and health unit activities in the area could be done with less friction by our 
organization and is therefore favorable.”10  Henry Carr, the IHD’s representative in Cuba, did a 
survey of the area and submitted a report in May of 1941 on health problems in the county.
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 His 
report noted that the Navy’s proposal was in line with the IHD’s larger mission in Cuba, as 
Guantanamo could be the first county in which to replicate the Marianao Health Unit model.  He 
validated the Navy’s concerns about off-base health conditions, stating “of what avail to protect 
the health of these men while they are within the Reservation if they are to be exposed to very 
considerable and very active sources of infection when making periodic visits outside the 
Reservation.”12 
The desirability of conducting this work through a private foundation was especially 
strong as tense negotiations between Havana and Washington were ongoing.  The Navy sought 
to expand the territorial limits of the Guantanamo Naval Reserve to meet the expanded vision of 
U.S. overseas defense, but these efforts were impeded by the new Cuban constitution, which 
forbade the ceding of further national territory to a foreign power.  The ambassador explicitly 
told IHD officials that “he did not feel inclined to complicate his present negotiation by 
presenting our project to the Cuban government but had no objection to our doing so.”13  
Ultimately, however, this public-private collaboration was not as successful in practice as it 
seemed it might be in theory.  Despite the legal difference between the government and the RF, 
the plans for a health unit in Guantanamo stalled out along with the negotiations regarding the 
expansion of the base.
14
  The IHD ultimately withdrew its proposal, though it did successfully 
undertake health work around bases in the British Caribbean, where questions of sovereignty 
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were quite different.  Not insignificantly, the RF was not completely divorced from the war 
effort, because the Malaria Commission that the RF created, remained active in Cuba after the 
RF’s withdrawal, and went on to assist the U.S. military in health work around military bases in 
other parts of the island.
15
   
In January of 1942, in response to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs of the American Republics met for a third time.  Article thirty of the Final Act of that 
meeting called for the improvement of health and sanitary conditions in the Americas and 
resolved that “the governments of the American Republics take individually, or by 
complementary agreements between two or more of them, appropriate steps to deal with 
problems of public health and sanitation, by providing, in accordance with ability, raw materials, 
services and funds.”16  Just a few months later, the Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA) 
was created to coordinate public health work with Latin American governments with the 
threefold objective of protecting the health of soldiers, enhancing the productivity of those 
engaged in vital resource extraction, and fostering goodwill and unity in the Americas.  
The IIAA did not displace the RF; indeed, it gained a lot from the RF, as the IIAA 
consulted IHD staff a great deal in elaborating projects and hiring personnel.  A delegate of the 
IHD sat on an advisory council to the IIAA, beside delegates from Departments of State, War, 
Navy, the U.S. Public Health Service, the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, the War Production 
Board, and the Office for Emergency Management.
17
 However, the greatest legacy of the RF  
appears to be in the model that the IIAA adopted in carrying out its work—the agency 
established cooperative programs with Latin American governments, paid for by a shared budget 
for which the Latin American government’s share increased annually.  As I continue my research, 
I hope to gain a better understanding of why this institutional shift took place within the 
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changing global context and how the more central role of the U.S. government in overseas health 
work, beginning in 1942, influenced the way that post-war international public health projects 
would be conducted. 
 
 
Editor's Note: This research report is presented here with the author’s permission but should not be cited 
or quoted without the author’s consent.  
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scholarship in the history of philanthropy and to highlight the diverse range of materials and subjects 
covered in the collections at the Rockefeller Archive Center. The reports are drawn from essays submitted 
by researchers who have visited the Archive Center, many of whom have received grants from the 
Archive Center to support their research.  
The ideas and opinions expressed in this report are those of the author and are not intended to 
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